In order to understand the idea of the overlapping consensus, it is wise to set it within the context of Rawls' overall project of establishing his theory of political liberalism. I will first briefly allude to the main points of this theory and then go on to discuss the particular doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will then examine some criticisms of it and evaluate Rawls' responses to them. I would argue that Rawls' arguments for the overlapping consensus are convincing, and that the overlapping consensus, as I understand it, is a persuasive doctrine.
In 'Political Liberalism', Rawls sets out to answer the question:
"How is it possible for there to exist over time a just, stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?" [P.4]
There are three main conditions that make up his theory of political liberalism:
(i) The basic structure of society is regulated by the political conception of justice
(ii) This is the focus of the overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines
(iii) Public discussion, when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at stake, is conducted in terms of the political conception of justice
What we are concerned with is the second of these points.
Rawls acknowledges that people may reasonably and rationally hold vastly different religious, philosophical and moral beliefs and he attempts to show how these can be fitted in to a framework of political liberalism. Rawls makes the distinction between conceptions of justice that allow for plurality of reasonable beliefs and those which do not (ie. that think there is one conception of the good which must be recognised by all rational people) The claim that is central to Rawls' argument seems to be this:
"No comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime" [P.135]
I would agree that even if you believe in an objective good which holds for all people, unless this can be proved rationally, then it is a mistake to base a political system upon it. Rawls makes the point that questions about constitutional essentials should be settled by consulting political values alone. He claims that the public conception of justice should be independent of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. It is important to realise that Rawls is not making the claim that particular beliefs and theories of the good are necessarily false, he merely argues that using political power to enforce them would be wrong.
Rawls answers a number of criticisms of his doctrine of overlapping consensus, and i would argue that his defences of the theory seem satisfactory. The first objection is that the overlapping consensus is merely a modus vivendi that is to say, a compromise pending the settlement of disputes about conceptions of the good. It is put forward as a criticism that there is no hope of political community, where everyone is united in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine. I agree with Rawls that this cannot be achieved because history shows us that reasonable pluralism is possible and he claims that oppressive state power is not permitted to overcome it. Rawls argues that the overlapping consensus is not merely a modus vivendi because it has a moral basis and it is stable, that is to say it will still be supported in spite of shifts in political power.
Another objection is that avoidance of comprehensive doctrines implies indifference or skepticism as to whether a political conception of justice can be true, as opposed to merely reasonable. Rawls replies that if this were true it would defeat the aim of an overlapping consensus. However, he argues that the political conception should be accepted as true by everyone, regardless of their particular beliefs. This can be illustrated by a parallel example of the case for religious toleration. Religious toleration does in no way deny that there can be religious truth. Rawls states:
"To apply the principals of toleration to philosophy itself is to leave to citizens themselves to settle the questions of religion, philosophy and morals in accordance with views they freely affirm." [P.154]
To conclude then, I would argue that Rawls' overlapping consensus idea is a plausible one. As a Christian I hold strong beliefs which implicate others, but I believe it would be wrong to force these beliefs onto others using political power. The reason for this is that God's existence cannot be proved or disproved and it is up to the individual to decide for themselves whether they find the evidence for the truth of the Bible, for instance, compelling. Rawls discusses this issue and concludes that it would be unreasonable to use political power to enforce a view on which reasonable people would vastly differ. The central issue seems to be how far we would wish the political constitution to reflect our own conception of the good.
I agree broadly with the political setup in this country, even though it allows some behaviour which I think is morally wrong (ie homosexuality) to go unpunished. Indeed, I am not sure that I would want homosexuality to be illegal. It is clear that whether something is right or wrong is a distinct and different issue from whether something should be illegal or not. This is evident especially in the case of actions which are regarded as morally wrong by many people, but which do not directly harm others. Examples of such would be cannabis smoking and, more controversially, pornography, homosexuality and euthanasia. These are cases in which the state does not need to intervene to protect an innocent person, and it seems to me that it is not the work of the state to guide the individual in these areas. Indeed, whilst I believe it is my duty to present the facts of the Gospel to others, I do not believe that I, or any form of government, have the right to intervene in cases such as these. It is one thing to inform others of your own belief about their actions, and another to restrict their free choice in performing such actions. Although I hold strongly to the truth of the Bible, I believe it would be morally abhorrent to force other people to act according to it.
© Anne Witton 1996. No part of this article may be copied without my permission.
